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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Manuel Castro appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion when it
determined the risk of undue prejudice from allowing the State to present evidence about his
gang affiliations did not substantially outweigh the potential probative value it had in regard to
his motive in this case. As such, this Court should vacate Mr. Castro's conviction and remand
this case for a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
While Mr. Castro was incarcerated at the Canyon County jail, a fight broke out. (See

generally State's Exhibit 5.) 1 Mr. Castro, who was on the other side of the tier at the time,
moved quickly toward the confrontation. (See State's Exhibit 5, ~15:08:25.) As he approached
the scene, he was confronted by another inmate, Augustin Olvera, who had raised his arms in an
aggressive manner. (Tr., p.162, Ls.12-18 (one of the jail deputies explaining the video shows
Mr. Olvera posture aggressively before anyone approached him); see State's Exhibit 5,
~15:08:40; compare Tr., p.179, L.12 - p.180, L.3 (Mr. Olvera testifying he only raised his hands
as Mr. Castro had begun approaching him).) Mr. Castro and Mr. Olvera fought, and, after two
other inmates joined in support of Mr. Castro, Mr. Olvera yielded. (See Tr., p.181, Ls.11-17.)
By that time, the first fight had calmed down, but others had broken out. (See generally
Exhibits 5, 7, 11.) Mr. Castro moved toward one of those new fights. (See generally Exhibits 5,
7, 11.) One of the responding deputies testified that Mr. Castro did not throw any punches at that
time, but rather, tried to get in between the other two inmates. (Tr., p.163, L.21 - p.164, L.1.)

1

The prosecutor used the time stamps from the videos when referring to these exhibits. (See,
e.g., Tr., p.141, Ls.6-12.) As such, Mr. Castro will do the same here when such references are
necessary.

1

Still, the deputy sprayed them with "OC" spray to subdue them and took Mr. Castro to the
ground. (Tr., p.196, L.11 - p.197, L.2.) However, yet another fight broke out near the bathroom
as another deputy tried to subdue other combatants, and the first deputy left Mr. Castro to help
break up the new fight. (Tr., p.197, L.12 - p.198, L.5.) Mr. Castro got up, went over toward the
bathroom, and after a few moments, went into the bathroom. (See Exhibit 7, ~15:09:34.) A third
responding deputy went into the bathroom, and saw Mr. Castro fighting, grabbed him, moved
him out of the bathroom and subdued him. (Tr., p.221, L.17 - p.22, L.13.) Mr. Castro was
ultimately indicted for riot with a gang enhancement. (R., pp.11-14.)
The State subsequently disclosed its intent to call an expert witness to explain various
aspects of gang culture.

(R., pp.59-60.)

This was relevant, the State asserted, because it

contended the fights were motivated by gang politics - that the combatants were all affiliated
with either the Norte:fio or Sure:fio gangs and they had fought strictly along those lines. (See
Tr., p.10, Ls.1-9.) Mr. Castro objected to that proposed testimony and moved for an order in

limine preventing the State from introducing any information about Mr. Castro's gang
affiliations because it was not relevant, and even if it was, the risk of undue prejudice from that
evidence substantially outweighed any probative value. (R., pp.87-91.) The State subsequently
filed a motion declaring its intent to elicit that sort of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) as evidence
of, inter alia, Mr. Castro's motive and intent. 2 (R., pp.107-08.)

2

In response to Mr. Castro's motion for a judgment of acquittal under I.C.R. 29, the State
subsequently argued that Mr. Castro's intent was less important because people could "act
together" under the riot statute even if they did not share a common purpose. (See Tr., p.262,
L.10 - p.263, L.17.) The district court concluded the jury could determine the combatants were
"acting together, whatever the legislature meant by that" based on the evidence the State
presented in that regard. (Tr., p.266, Ls.9-22.) However, it expressed concerns that the statute
did not identify an intent element. (Tr., p.231, Ls.2-4.) As such, it ultimately decided to instruct
the jurors on the definition of ''willfully." (See Tr., p.276, L.25 - p.277, L.3.)
2

The district court ruled the gang affiliation evidence was highly probative to Mr. Castro's
motive and intent. (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-13.) It also decided that the risk of undue prejudice did not
substantially outweigh that probative value, though "[i]n my mind, that was a close call."
(Tr., p.21, Ls.13-16, p.171, Ls.11-18.)

The tipping point in that analysis, the district court

explained, was the fact that it was going to give a limiting instruction to the jury on that point.
(Tr., p.171, Ls.17-18; see Tr., p.176, Ls.3-15, p.275, Ls.2-11 (giving the limiting instruction).)
At the trial, the State did not call its expert witness.

(See generally Tr.) Rather, it

presented the testimony of two of the other inmates who had been involved in the fight instead.

(See generally Tr.)

Neither of those inmates claimed intimate gang affiliation, but rather,

explained that when they entered the jail, they had been told they had to choose a side.
(Tr., p.175, Ls.8-18; p.210, L.10 - p.211, L.8.)

Mr. Olvera explained he had chosen the

"Northside" (Nortefios). (Tr., p.175, L.24 - L.176, L.1.) He believed Mr. Castro and the other
two inmates who fought with him were Southsiders (Surefios). (Tr., p.180, Ls.15-16.) He also
explained the initial fight had begun because some of the Nortefios were using one of their
gang's chants while exercising, and some Surefios took exception to that. (Tr., p.178, Ls.3-13.)
The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Castro as charged.

(R., p.146.) Mr. Castro then

entered made an Alford admission3 to the enhancement. (Tr., p.309, L.22-p.312, L.16.) The
district court subsequently imposed a unified sentence of seven years, all indeterminate, to be
served consecutive to his other sentences. (Tr., p.333, L.23 - p.334, L.9.) Mr. Castro filed a
notice of appeal timely from the resulting judgment of conviction. (R., pp.187, 189.)

3

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
3

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by determining the risk of undue prejudice from
admitting evidence of Mr. Castro's gang affiliations did not substantially outweigh the minimal
probative value it had toward his motive.

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Determining The Risk Of Undue Prejudice From
Admitting Evidence Of Mr. Castro's Gang Affiliations Did Not Substantially Outweigh The
Minimal Probative Value It Had Toward His Motive
A.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing the decision to allow propensity evidence under I.R.E. 404(b ), the

appellate courts conduct a two-tiered analysis. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 229 (2008). It
freely reviews the determination of whether the evidence is relevant to a non-propensity purpose,
and it reviews the determination of whether the risk of undue prejudice substantially outweighs
the probative value for an abuse of discretion. Id. The district court abuses its discretion when:
(1) it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion; (2) it acts beyond the outer bounds of its
discretion; (3) it acts inconsistently with the applicable legal standards, or (4) it reaches its
decision without exercising reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018).

B.

When The Risk Of Undue Prejudice And The Potential Probative Value Of The Evidence
Of Mr. Castro's Gang Affiliation Are Properly Understood, The Risk Of Undue Prejudice
Substantially Outweighed The Probative Value
As the district court pointed out, this was a close case in terms of weighing the risk of

undue prejudice and the probative value of the gang affiliation evidence. (Tr., p.171, Ls.11-18.)
The thing that tipped the scales toward admission in this case, in the district court's mind, was
the fact that it was going to give a limiting instruction regarding the use of that evidence. (See
Tr., p.171, Ls.17-18) That analysis reveals the district court did not reach its decision in an
exercise ofreason in two respects. First, the weight it put on the probative value of Mr. Castro's
motive was not supported by the record or the applicable law, and second, the reduced weight it
gave to the risk of undue prejudice did not account for the fact that this is one of the situations
where a limiting instruction may not actually cure the risk of undue prejudice.

5

First, the district court misunderstood just how probative this evidence was, given the
elements of riot. As the district court noted, the riot statute does not contain an intent element.
(Tr., p.231, Ls.2-4.) Rather, it only requires two or people acting together and causing injury,
damage, or disturbance. LC. § 18-6401. While there is no case law exploring the riot statute
specifically, in this respect, it is similar to the battery statute. The battery statute only requires
the person to intend their conduct, not that they need to have any sort of specific criminal intent.
See, e.g., State v. Billings, 137 Idaho 827, 830 (Ct. App. 2002). Basically, the battery statute
does not really care why one person strikes another, just that they intended to strike that other
person. See id. The same appears true of the riot statute. See I. C. § 18-6401. The instruction
the district court ultimately gave on intent actually reflects this point: "One can act willfully
without intending to violate the law, to injury another, or to acquire any advantage." (Tr., p.277,
Ls.1-3.)
The district court's acceptance of the State's subsequent argument on Mr. Castro's
motion for directed verdict also demonstrates this is the proper understanding of the riot statute.
(Tr., p.263, Ls.15-17 (asserting there was no need for an agreement of purpose between the
participants in a riot).) Rather, the State asserted, it was sufficient that multiple people were
simply punching at the same person. (See Tr., p.262, L.10 - p.263, L.14.) The district court
agreed with the State, though it noted that the relevant statutory language was potentially
ambiguous in that regard. (See Tr., p.266, Ls.9-22.) If there was no need for an agreement under
this statute, Mr. Castro's motive was not particularly relevant to the question of whether he
engaged in a riot.
Rather, specific intent only comes into play in this context, as in the battery context, if
there is some sort of enhancement is alleged. For example, the person's intent becomes relevant

6

to a battery ifit is alleged to have been based on the victim's race. See I.C. § 18-7902 (actually
defining that as a separate crime of malicious harassment). However, in this case, State elected,
and the district court used, a bifurcated proceeding to present the gang enhancement.

( See

generally R., pp.11-14,142.) The reason the bifurcated trial procedure developed is precisely
because these sort of enhancements carry a significant possibility of prejudicing the jury's
evaluation of the base charge. See, e.g., State v. Roy, 127 Idaho 228, 230 (1995) (discussing the
bifurcation procedure in relation to enhancements based on prior convictions).

Thus, while

Mr. Castro's gang affiliation might have been relevant to his case in the general sense, it was
only relevant to the second part of the trial, not the first part. Since Mr. Castro's motive was not
particularly probative to the first part of the trial, the district court abused its discretion when it
allowed that evidence to be presented in the first part of the trial based on its determination that
the risk of undue prejudice did not outweigh that minimal probative value.
Second, the district court misunderstood the risk of undue prejudice because its reliance
on the limiting instruction was misplaced. As the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized, some
propensity evidence is so pervasive that a limiting instruction will not be able to prevent
propensity analysis from still tainting the verdict, even if subconsciously. Compare, e.g., State v.
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664 (2010) (quoting State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569-70 (2007) (quoting
D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook § 13.9 (1995))) (explaining that, because the risk of
prejudice from evidence of prior sexual misconduct with children was so high, there was still a
reasonable possibility the jury's verdict was tainted by "'unstated"' propensity considerations
despite the fact that the district court gave a limiting instruction which "surely helped mitigate"
against that prejudice); State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 229 n.3 (2007) (explaining that the risk
of undue prejudice from evidence that the defendant had dealt methamphetamine still

7

substantially outweighed the probative value of that evidence even though the district court had
given a limiting instruction in regard to that evidence). 4
Given the negative connotations society associates with gangs, this risk of undue
prejudice from this sort of evidence - that the jury will convict because of his gang affiliation
rather than on a determination of whether he the State has proved him guilty of this particular
offense - is so pervasive that, like in Johnson, the limiting instruction, helpful though it may
have been, did not sufficiently ameliorate the risk of undue prejudice. This is particularly true
because the way in which the State was using this evidence - that the jury should conclude
Mr. Castro was "rioting" because he was in a gang - still hints at a propensity reasoning.
Compare State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 540 (Ct. App. 2012) (in which evidence that one of the
witnesses was in a gang with the defendant was only admitted to show that the witness had a bias
in favor of the defendant, rather than to show the defendant had committed the charged offense).
As such, the district court's analysis under the second part of the analysis under I.RE.
404(b) was not an exercise of reason because it misunderstood not only the extent of both the
probative nature and the prejudicial impact of this evidence. Essentially, based on its mistaken
understanding of the evidence, it erroneously added weight to the probative side of the scale and
took weight away from the prejudicial side for reasons not supported by the record and
applicable legal standards. And even with the weights mistakenly skewed in that manner, it still
found this was a close case. Therefore, it abused its discretion by admitting the evidence of
Mr. Castro's gang affiliation in the State's case in chief in the first part of the bifurcated trial.
4

The specific problem with the limiting instruction in Sheldon was that it was generic and did
not specifically refer to the particular evidence of that case. Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 229 n.3. The
limiting instructions the district court gave in this case was more specific than the instruction in
Sheldon. (See Tr., p.176, Ls.3-15, p.275, Ls.2-11.) However, Sheldon is still useful because it
demonstrates that this concern - that limiting instructions may not be sufficient to corral the risk
of undue prejudice - exists beyond the context of sexual deviancy.
8

CONCLUSION
Mr. Castro respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, reverse the
order admitting the evidence of his gang affiliation in the first part of the bifurcated trial, and
remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 19th day of September, 2019.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of September, 2019, I caused a true and
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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